On the effects of ranking by unemployment duration by Preugschat, Edgar & Fernández-Blanco, Javier
On the Effects of Ranking by Unemployment Duration ∗
Javier Fernández-Blanco† Edgar Preugschat‡
February 20, 2018
Abstract
We propose a theory based on the firm’s hiring behavior that rationalizes the ob-
served significant decline of callback rates for an interview and exit rates from unem-
ployment and the mild decline of reemployment wages over unemployment duration.
We build a directed search model with symmetric incomplete information on worker
types and non-sequential search by firms. Sorting due to firms’ testing of applicants in
the past makes expected productivity fall with duration, which induces firms to rank
applicants by duration. In equilibrium callback and exit rates both fall with unem-
ployment duration. In our numerical exercise using U.S. data we show that our model
can replicate quite well the observed falling patterns, with the firm’s ranking decision
accounting for a sizable part.
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It is well documented that exit rates from unemployment strongly fall with unemployment
duration. Most explanations of this pattern have focused on the supply side, assigning a very
limited role to firms. A primary reason for this has been the scarcity of empirical evidence
about the hiring process. However, recent field experiments provide strong indication that
firms make use of the information that unemployment duration conveys for their recruiting
decisions. By submitting applications of fictitious workers to job postings, Oberholzer-Gee
(2008), Kroft et al. (2013) and Eriksson and Rooth (2014) find that the rate at which an
applicant is called back for an interview (i.e. the callback rate) significantly declines with
unemployment duration.1
When unemployment duration is informative about workers’ expected productivity and
firms meet several applicants at once, recruiting firms have incentives to rank applicants
by duration when calling them for interviews. Note, however, that the firm’s ranking re-
duces the chances to fill a vacancy as those job-seekers who anticipate that they will be
discriminated against will apply somewhere else unless wages compensate for the additional
unemployment risk. Thus, the ranking of candidates that firms choose will depend on both
expected productivity and wages.
In this paper, we analyze the firm’s optimal hiring decisions, and how these decisions
determine the duration dynamics of callback rates for an interview, exit rates from unem-
ployment and reemployment wages. We show that firms rank applicants by unemployment
duration in equilibrium, which endogenizes the ranking mechanism first introduced by Blan-
chard and Diamond (1994). We also show that our theory rationalizes the observed severe
fall of callback and exit rates as well as the mild decline of wages over duration. Furthermore,
we find that the ranking mechanism is crucial for these results, and that its quantitative role
can be important to explain the evidence.
To explicitly model the ranking strategies of employers, we set up a directed search model
of the labor market with two key ingredients. First, skilled workers are both more productive
and more likely to be suitable for any job than the unskilled, but information about workers’
type is symmetric and incomplete. Second, firms can screen out unsuitable applicants, and
can discriminate among observationally different workers both ex-ante through wages and
ex-post by deciding on a ranking of the candidates to be tested.
In our model, unobserved heterogeneity together with the firms’ testing in the past leads
1Farber et al. (2017) find no variation of callback rates over unemployment duration for US college-
graduated females aged 35+ for clerical jobs in the U.S. In their comparison with Kroft et al. (2013), they
conclude that age and hence working experience may account for the differences.
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to sorting as in the seminal paper by Lockwood (1991), i.e. skilled workers leave the un-
employment pool faster. As a result, unemployment duration conveys information about
expected productivity. Firms set wages to solve the trade-off spelled out above between
attracting more applicants and testing them according to a chosen ranking. Notice that if
firms committed to a single wage, as in Lang et al. (2005) and Peters (2010), the ranking by
unemployment duration would be the obvious optimal decision ex-post, but firms would at-
tract fewer applicants. In contrast, we allow firms to commit to a menu of wages, potentially
contingent on expected productivity. Equilibrium wages pay a share of worker’s productivity
net of the value of the next best candidate, thereby making the most productive applicants
the most profitable ones as well as ensuring that all workers obtain their market value when
queueing for the job. As a result, the labor market is non-segmented in equilibrium because
firms find it optimal to attract workers of all durations to increase their job-filling rate and
to save on wages as the presence of more competitors reduces the marginal value of any given
worker. Importantly, wages need not monotonically decline over unemployment duration.
Why do exit rates fall as unemployment duration increases? First, because applicants
are tested only if no worker with shorter duration either applied for the job or was found
to be suitable, thereby leading callback rates for an interview to fall with duration. Second,
exit rates also fall due to sorting as the share of skilled workers in the unemployment pool
becomes smaller with duration, and hence so does the probability of succeeding at the test. 2
We then investigate the effects of the firm’s ranking decision by comparing to an alter-
native economy that only differs from the benchmark in that firms are forced to test all
applicants. We refer to it as the NR economy. In this alternative setting, callback rates
are constant in duration by assumption, and, although firms can still discriminate among
observationally different workers through wages, the labor market is segmented in equilib-
rium.3 The elimination of the ranking margin makes it too costly for firms to attract all
applicants: the gains from the higher job-filling rates when also attracting workers with
longer unemployment spells are offset by the lower expected productivity per filled vacancy
and the higher wage costs necessary to compensate the more productive workers for their
lower matching rates. When firms can discriminate in favor of the more productive workers
2Notice that the declining pattern over unemployment duration hinges on the labor market being non-
segmented in equilibrium. If it were segmented to some degree with different submarkets targeting different
subsets of unemployment duration, for example because firms could not make offers contingent on productiv-
ity like in Peters (2010), then callback rates might exhibit upward jumps when moving from one submarket
to the subsequent one as applicants would go from being ranked last to being ranked first.
3This is in line with the results obtained in Menzio and Shi (2010) with on-the-job directed search and
heterogeneous workers. Furthermore, Lang et al. (2005) and Peters (2010) show that the wage margin is
also central for the market to be non-segmented by studying an economy in which firms commit to a single
wage but can rank applicants.
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instead, such costs do not exist. Likewise, we find that while in our benchmark economy
exit rates always fall with duration but wages might be non-monotone, wages in the NR
economy continuously fall and the duration dynamics of exit rates are ambiguous.
We evaluate the quantitative properties of our model to gauge how well it can replicate
the data, and to illustrate the effects of the firms’ ranking decision. We calibrate the model
to the U.S. labor market. We target several moments of the duration distribution of exit
rates that we construct from the Current Population Survey (CPS), whereas no information
from wages and callback rates is used. The simulated data replicates very well the actual
distribution of exit rates. In addition, model wages show a declining pattern over unem-
ployment duration very close to the actual one we obtain from the CPS. Callback rates also
significantly drop with duration in line with the empirical evidence from the aforementioned
field experiments. Moreover, the comparison between the benchmark and the NR equilib-
rium allocations suggests that ranking strongly amplifies the fall of exit rates along duration,
even if the degree of ex-ante heterogeneity is very small.
Our main contribution to the macroeconomic literature is to provide a theory that jointly
rationalizes the observed duration patterns of callback rates, exit rates, and wages. As we
briefly discuss below, previous work has primarily focused on mechanisms that theoretically
explain the decline of job-finding rates along unemployment duration, giving little role to
wages and, more generally, to the firms’ hiring behavior. In contrast, our theory is based on
firm’s endogenous ranking induced by sorting, which together with the equilibrium wages
firms commit to ensures a non-segmented labor market.
Our ranking result is a form of rational stigma based on the information conveyed by
the sorting of unemployed workers as time passes. Lockwood (1991) first modeled rational
stigma associated with long-term unemployment as a duration cut-off rule within a random
search framework. Two recent pieces in this vein that have a quantitative approach are
Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015), who also study the duration dynamics of callback rates, and
Doppelt (2015). Search is random and wages do not play an allocative role in these papers
since they are derived from a surplus-sharing rule. To gain tractability, firms have all the
bargaining power in Lockwood (1991) and Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015), but thereby making
reemployment wages constant in duration as in the ranking model of Blanchard and Diamond
(1994). In Doppelt (2015), workers learn about their types during both employment and
unemployment spells, and, according to his calibration exercise, his stigma mechanism also
accounts for a sizable part of the decline in exit rates, with equilibrium wages varying non-
monotonically with duration.
We also contribute to the directed search literature that started with Peters (1991) and
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Moen (1997). Within this literature, ranking as a decision of firms has first been modeled in
a static setting by Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a).4 Their primary focus is on the assignment
of exogenously heterogeneous workers to a distribution of firms. Instead, we investigate the
effects of ranking on the duration dynamics of exit rates and wages when the distribution
of expected productivities is endogenous. Furthermore, and in contrast to their models, we
argue that the equilibrium allocation is not constrained efficient in our setting due to an
intertemporal information externality.
In closely related work, Gonzalez and Shi (2010) analyze an economy with bilateral
meetings, where equally productive workers learn about their matching ability (akin to
our concept of suitability) from their own search. In contrast to our benchmark model,
a segmented labor market arises endogenously because staying unemployed one more period
makes workers search for lower wage jobs, which are easier to obtain. Therefore, reemploy-
ment wages decline with duration in equilibrium, but exit rates need not fall because of
sorting. Flemming (2015) also rationalizes the different sensitivity of exit rates and wages
to unemployment duration in a directed search model with learning by doing.
As the assumption of non-sequential search of firms is key for our results, we now briefly
summarize the empirical evidence in its support. Using Dutch data, van Ours and Ridder
(1992) and Abbring and van Ours (1994) conclude that firms’ search is non-sequential, unlike
workers’ search. Consistent with these findings, van Ommeren and Russo (2009) find that
whether firms’ search is sequential depends on the search method. In particular, firms search
non-sequentially when they use formal methods such as advertising.
Finally, there is a number of theories, complementary to ours, that model a causal effect
of duration on exit rates. Workers may get discouraged if the returns to their search fall
with unemployment duration due to for example skill attrition (Pissarides (1992)). Fewer job
opportunities also arise as unemployment progresses in stock-flow search models (Coles and
Smith (1998)) and models with informational networks deteriorating along unemployment
duration (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004)).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the benchmark economy and
characterize the equilibrium. Section 3 studies the economy without ranking. In Section 4,
we undertake a numerical exercise. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses some central
assumptions of the model. All proofs and data work are relegated to the Appendix and the
Online Appendix.
4Moen (1999) constructs a model of ranking by education showing that human capital investments prior
to matching are undertaken not only to raise future wages, but also employment prospects.
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2 Benchmark Model
This section presents a directed search model of the labor market in which firms may dis-
criminate among applicants in wages and in the hiring decision.
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a unit mass of infinitely lived workers and a
large continuum of identical firms. The mass of new firms is determined by free entry every
period. All agents are risk neutral and discount future payoffs at a common factor β. The
focus of this paper is on the steady-state allocation; hence, time indices are suppressed.
Workers can be either skilled (type h) or unskilled (type `). There is a mass µ ∈ (0, 1)
of skilled workers, and 1 − µ of unskilled workers. Worker types differ both by their market
productivity and by their idiosyncratic suitability at any given firm. A type- i job-seeker
turns out to be suitable for the job at hand with probability λi, with i ∈ {`, h}. If a worker
is not suitable for a given job, the match is not productive and the worker is not hired. A
type-i suitable applicant produces yi units of output if hired. We assume that skilled workers
have higher chances of being suitable and perform strictly better at the production stage,
i.e. 0 < λ` < λh ≤ 1 and y` < yh.5
At the beginning of every period, workers can be either employed or unemployed. The
unemployed seek job opportunities and derive utility from home production, b < y`. Let
τ denote their elapsed duration of unemployment, with τ = 1, 2, ..., T . The value τ = T
stands for unemployment durations greater than or equal to T . That is, workers with
τ = T form the homogeneous group of the long-term unemployed. Unemployment duration
is public information.6 In contrast, there is symmetric incomplete information on the type
of the worker. That is, the worker’s type is unobservable to both the worker herself and
potential employers. Concretely, we make two assumptions on what information is held and
acquired in each period to ensure that current unemployment duration is the only observable
characteristic.
5Our suitability concept is in line with the frictions proposed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p.402).
We further comment on this in Section 4. It could also be interpreted as an extreme form of match-specific
productivity if output is the product of a match-specific component and worker’s time-invariant productivity.
We would say that a worker is unsuitable for a given firm if the match-specific term were zero. Suitability
may also represent a reduced-form of modeling the scope of tasks at a given job, where skilled workers can
do a larger number of tasks. The central assumption in our setting is that skilled workers perform better at
the testing stage.
6Kroft et al. (2013) report that 75% of the actual resumes they collected from job boards did specify the
year and month the last job of the candidate had ended.
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First, we assume that information about a worker’s type reduces to her current unem-
ployment spell. Specifically, the worker herself only knows the information of the current
spell. This assumption is made for tractability since the whole labor history of each worker
would be informative to herself and recruiting firms otherwise. In support of this, Eriksson
and Rooth (2014) find that past, unlike contemporary, unemployment does not drive the
recruiting decisions of firms. Second, for tractability and since our main interest is the hir-
ing behavior of firms, we abstract from the worker’s learning, which has been modeled in
Gonzalez and Shi (2010), and assume that job-seekers do not learn from their own search
experience. Thus, a worker’s search influences only their contemporaneous prospects in the
labor market, but do not affect their continuation value of unemployment if failing to find a
job.7
Consequently, workers with unemployment duration τ are all observationally identical,





where ui(τ) denotes the measure of unemployed workers of type i and duration τ at the
beginning of a given period. The unemployment distribution u ≡ {ui(τ)}i,τ is the aggregate
state variable in this economy. The expected match productivity of a suitable candidate of





Each period consists of four stages: the separation stage, the job-posting stage, the
application and meeting stage, and the hiring and production stage. At the beginning of
the period, in the first stage, idiosyncratic job-separation shocks hit ongoing matches with
probability δ. In those cases, the worker becomes newly unemployed and the firm exits.
The Job-posting Stage. In the second stage, firms decide whether to enter the labor
market or not. As is common in the search literature, each firm posts a single vacancy.
Firms incur a cost k when posting the vacancy. To ensure existence of equilibria, we assume
that vacancy creation costs are low relative to the discounted net productivity of unskilled
workers, i.e. k < y`−b
1−β(1−δ) .
Recruiting firms announce and fully commit to a contract. A contractual offer consists of
7We discuss the sensitivity of the main results to the information structure in Sections 4.2 and 5.
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a menu of wages, which may be contingent on expected productivity.8 Let ω ≡ {wτ}τ≤T ∈
[0, yh]
T denote a job offer. We shall refer to a submarket as the marketplace defined by
a given contract. Two remarks are in order. First, we could allow for wage contracts to
specify a continuous function of expected productivity. Since in our model only a finite
number of expected productivity levels prevail, we can restrict the set of contracts to finite
wage schemes without loss of generality. Second, we index wages by unemployment duration
instead of expected productivity. This notation does not mean that wages are contingent
on duration, as it may be against the law. This is for notational simplicity as expected
productivity given by expression (2) maps bijectively to unemployment duration.
The Application and Meeting Stage. Unemployed workers observe all job offers and
submit one application. Search is directed in the sense that those vacancies that promise a
higher expected value will attract a larger number of applicants. However, firms set a menu of
wages not only to trade off higher wages with a higher rate of applications (extensive margin),
but also to influence the relative number of candidates of a given expected productivity
(intensive margin).
Meetings are multilateral in the sense that any given firm may receive several appli-
cations. As is standard to assume in the literature for large economies, (observationally)
identical workers use identical mixed application strategies, and, hence, the realized number
of applications a firm receives for any given unemployment duration is a Poisson random
variable under the assumption that actual applications are independent across workers. The
key characteristic of a multilateral meeting technology is that it enables firms to compare
applicants.
The Hiring and Production Stage. In the hiring stage, firms make three decisions if
receiving any application. First, they rank candidates according to their expected profitabil-
ity. Second, they test those who are ranked first. Third, they select a suitable applicant,
if there is any. In this last step, firms are assumed to randomize among suitable workers
who are observationally identical (i.e. with the same unemployment duration), leading to
the so-called coordination frictions. If no candidate is suitable, then they continue testing in
the chosen order. The firm vanishes if there is no suitable candidate queueing for the job.
Firms have access to a simple testing technology: A firm observes a private, match-specific
signal, which perfectly identifies unsuitable matches. Unsuitable candidates are discarded as
8In particular, wages cannot be contingent on ex-ante unobservables such as the ex-post revealed actual
productivity or the outcome of the meeting process (that is, e.g., how many applications the firm received
of each type). We think of those events as unverifiable by a third party and therefore non-enforceable.
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the match turns out to be unproductive. Other than determining suitability, firms have no
means to identify the type of the applicants when making the hiring decision. We assume
that the test outcome is not verifiable and cannot be traded. Thus, neither workers nor
other firms learn the private signals of any given firm. Furthermore, the testing expenses
are included in the vacancy creation cost k.
Firms decide on an order to start testing applicants.9 Formally, a firm sets a ranking rule
σ. This ordering must be such that, for any τ, τ ′ ∈ {1, ..., T},
σ(τ) < σ(τ ′) iff either Jτ (ω) > Jτ ′(ω) or Jτ (ω) = Jτ ′(ω) and τ < τ
′, (3)
where Jτ (ω) stands for the type-ω firm’s expected discounted value when filling the vacancy
with a suitable worker of duration τ . We have imposed that if two different durations
correspond to the same expected profitability, then workers with the shorter spell are ranked
higher by assumption. For a given value of the state variable u, the permutation σ is bijective
by construction.
We are interested in the equilibrium allocation in which firms rank candidates by un-
employment duration. Therefore, for expositional simplicity, we guess that the ranking rule
σ(τ) = τ is consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior of firms, and, later on, Propo-
sition 2.3 will verify this guess. The intuition is that expected productivity declines with
unemployment duration irrespective of the ranking rule firms have chosen in the past as the
more productive workers are more likely to leave unemployment at any duration. Thus, our
guess on the optimal ranking rule must be read as follows: firms rank candidates by expected
productivity because the more productive applicants are also the more profitable ones. All
agents rationally anticipate that recruiting firms will optimally rank workers by expected
productivity (or, equivalently, duration) at any point in time. Finally, production takes
place.The worker and all other agents in the economy only observe the hiring decision. 10
Matching Probabilities. A firm posting a job ω expects qτ (ω) suitable applicants of
duration τ . To simplify notation, we will omit the dependence of the expected queue length
9Since testing costs are included in the vacancy creation costs k, firms could test all applicants at once
instead of proceeding according to some order, and then rank suitable candidates by profitability. The
economy that results from this alternative interpretation is completely equivalent to ours, except for the
fact that the rate at which an applicant is called back for an interview would be 1 for all applicants by
construction. However, our setting can be defended on the grounds that a tiny testing cost would make
firms establish some order in the testing process.
10Consistent with our information assumptions, we can assume that either the actual worker’s productivity
is never learned by employers, or it is instantaneously learned upon hiring but firing is not allowed because
of full commitment.
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q on the contract ω hereafter, unless needed for clarity. Define qτ ≡ (q1, q2, ..., qτ ). For each
firm, the probability of filling a job ω with a suitable worker of duration τ is
ητ (q








The first factor of this expression stands for the Poisson probability that no worker with a
higher ranking than a candidate of duration τ either applies to the firm or, if applies, is found
suitable for the job. The second term is the Poisson probability that the firm receives at
least one suitable application from workers of duration τ . Note that this expression captures
both the firm’s ranking strategy and the fact that unsuitable workers are never hired.
Since the measures of newly employed workers and filled vacancies of each duration must
coincide, it must be the case that ντ (q
τ )qτ = ητ (q
τ ), where ντ (q
τ ) denotes the job-finding
probability for a worker of duration τ conditional on applying to a type-ω firm and being
suitable for the job. That is,
ντ (q
τ ) = e−
∑




Therefore, the actual matching probability for a worker of duration τ is then defined as
hτ (q
τ ) = pτντ (q
τ ) = e−
∑




The exit rate from unemployment has three components. The first factor incorporates the
firm’s ranking strategy. We refer to it as the callback rate as it is the probability of being
called for an interview, which occurs if no suitable worker with a shorter spell queued up
for the same job. The second term captures how the composition of the unemployment pool
evolves with unemployment duration, i.e. the sorting mechanism. The third term results
from the standard coordination frictions among applicants of duration τ .
Value Functions. Let us proceed with the value functions of workers and firms. An em-
ployed worker derives utility from wages until the arrival of an idiosyncratic job-termination
shock, which occurs with probability δ. Her value function is defined by
Eτ (ω) = wτ + β
(
δU1 + (1− δ)Eτ (ω)
)
(7)
An unemployed worker of duration τ has value Uτ . She may apply to any posted job offer
ω, and becomes employed with probability hτ (q
τ (ω)), in which case she receives the value
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Eτ (ω). Otherwise, she produces b at home and remains unemployed one more period. A
worker of duration τ applies to a job offering contract ω if the expected value derived from ω
equates the unemployment value Uτ for a positive qτ (ω). Otherwise, no worker of duration
τ applies to such a job, and qτ (ω) = 0. Expectations about qτ (ω) are thus pinned down on
and off the equilibrium. The following equilibrium condition summarizes this logic.
Uτ ≥ hτ (q
τ (ω)) (Eτ (ω)− b− βUτ+1) + b+ βUτ+1 (8)
and qτ (ω) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness,
where UT+1 ≡ UT .
Now, the expected value of a firm offering contract ω and filling its vacancy with a worker
of duration τ amounts to the worker’s expected productivity net of wages until the arrival
of a job-destruction shock, when it exits the economy. Its value function is defined by
Jτ (ω) = yτ − wτ + β(1− δ)Jτ (ω). (9)
Firms write contracts to maximize profits. A firm incurs a recruitment cost k when
posting a vacancy. A job with contract ω is filled with a candidate of duration τ with
probability ητ (q
τ (ω)), and then the firm obtains the expected value Jτ (ω). The value function












Next, we define the symmetric directed search equilibrium in the steady state. We use the
term symmetric to refer to the case where identical agents make identical decisions. In
particular, all firms commit to the same contract.
Definition 1 A steady state symmetric directed search equilibrium consists of a distribution
of unemployed workers u ∈ [0, 1]2×T , value functions Jτ , Eτ : [0, yh]T → R+, and V, Uτ ∈
R+, ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T}, a menu of contracts ω ∈ [0, yh]T , an expected queue length function
Q ≡ (Qτ )τ : [0, yh]T → R+
T , and the ranking rule σ(τ) ≡ τ such that:
i) Given Q and u, the value functions satisfy the Bellman equations (7)-(10).
ii) Firms’ profit maximization and zero-profit condition:
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- Given u and ω, the ranking rule σ satisfies condition (3).
- Given (Uτ )τ , Q, and u, ω is the profit-maximizing contract, and expected profits
become zero at ω:
∀ω′∈[0, yh]





′) ≤ V = 0, with equality for ω′ = ω.
iii) Workers direct their search:
∀ω′ ∈ [0, yh]T and ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T}, Qτ (ω′) satisfies the complementary slackness condi-
tion (8).
iv) Recursivity condition:
Let qτ ≡ Qτ (ω). The distribution of workers recursively satisfies





, ∀τ ∈ {2, ..., T − 1},


























, if qτ 6= 0. (12)
Firms maximize profits, which equal zero in equilibrium because of free entry. To rank
applicants by unemployment duration is profit maximizing. The third equilibrium condition
is required to pin down rational expectations on queue lengths out of the equilibrium. This
condition determines the expected queue length for any given contract attractive to workers
by making them indifferent between the equilibrium contract and this other offer.
The aggregate state variable u is determined by the history of all agents’ equilibrium
decisions. The Law of Large Numbers ensures that a measure ui(τ)λiντ (q
τ ) of type i workers
with duration τ becomes employed. Thus, the fourth condition determines the law of motion
for the state variable. Finally, the set of constraints (12) result from the requirement that in
a symmetric equilibrium the ratio of suitable workers to the queue length must be the same
across durations.
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We now rewrite expression (10) as the profit maximization problem of a representative





τ )Jτ (ω)− k (13)
s. to pτητ (q
τ )
(






= qτUτ , ∀τ
That is, firms choose the pair (ω, qT ) that maximizes their profits, rationally anticipating the
relationship between wages and queue lengths that arises from the optimal search behavior of
workers. Indeed, the constraints are the equilibrium complementary slackness conditions ( 8).
For later use, it is convenient to define ∆τ ≡ Jτ (ω)+Eτ (ω)−b−βUτ+1 =
yτ+βδU1
1−β(1−δ)−b−βUτ+1.
It is the net value of a match with a worker of duration τ . The following proposition states
that there exists a solution for the firm’s problem. We also provide a sufficient condition
for uniqueness. Moreover, we show that it is optimal for firms to attract applicants of all
durations in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1 Given the state variable u and the unemployment values Uτ for τ ∈
{1, ..., T}, there exists a solution (ω, qT ) for the firm’s program. If ∆τ falls with duration,
then the firm’s problem has a unique solution. Furthermore, in any symmetric equilibrium,
all queue lengths are strictly positive, qτ > 0 ∀τ .
The next proposition establishes existence of a symmetric equilibrium by showing that
it can be formulated as a fixed point problem.
Proposition 2.2 There exists a symmetric directed search equilibrium.
This result together with Proposition 2.1 implies that workers of all unemployment du-
rations search in the same labor market. Firms find it profitable to attract all workers in
order to both increase the probability of filling their vacancies and extract a higher share
of the surplus from a given match. The latter relies on the firms’ ability of treating differ-
ent applicants differently through wages and ranking. To see this, notice that, because of
the ranking by expected productivity, the presence of workers with longer unemployment
durations queueing for the job hedges the firm’s risks of ending up with the vacancy not
filled by any worker of duration τ . As a result, the standard trade-off between wages and
job-filling rates is weakened for applicants with shorter durations, so that firms lower the
wage promises to these workers.
A natural question is why there is no profitable deviation targeting only a subset of
workers. This is a fair critique to random search models with ranking wherein all job-seekers
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are concentrated in a single market by assumption, like Blanchard and Diamond (1994). See
e.g. Shi (2002). The intuition underlying this critique is that if workers could direct their
search, the ranking strategy would no longer take place in equilibrium. This is because firms
could profitably deviate by targeting only workers with a given duration τ and saving on
wages by offering them a higher job-finding rate. In contrast, this logic does not hold in
our setting because the deviating firms would find it more profitable to attract not only all
workers with durations longer than τ for the two reasons listed above, but also workers with
shorter durations as they are more profitable. Therefore, deviations with such a recruiting
strategy cannot be profitable.11
2.3 Equilibrium Duration Dynamics
In this section, we look at the duration dynamics of the equilibrium variables. A key result is
stated in the following proposition: although the distribution of expected productivities is an
endogenous outcome, expected productivity falls with unemployment duration regardless of
how firms ranked candidates in the past. The underlying intuition is that skilled candidates
are more likely to be suitable for any job than their unskilled counterparts at any duration
and, hence, the relative mass of skilled job-seekers declines as the duration of unemployment
increases. Therefore, ordering candidates by expected productivity is equivalent to ordering
them by unemployment duration. It turns out that the most productive candidates are the
most profitable ones in equilibrium as the fall in the expected productivity is not offset by
the wage changes over duration. We give more intuition for why wages decline by less than
expected productivity when we discuss equilibrium wages further below in this section. As a
result, it is optimal for firms to rank candidates by their unemployment duration, confirming
that the imposed ranking rule is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior.
Proposition 2.3 Independently of the ranking rule, yτ falls with unemployment duration τ .
Furthermore, the value of an active firm Jτ (ω) declines with τ in equilibrium.
The continuous decline in expected productivity suggests that the employment prospects
of a worker also deteriorate over time. Proposition 2.4 shows that the equilibrium unem-
ployment value, Uτ , declines with duration. More importantly for us, callback rates for an
interview and exit rates from unemployment also fall with duration. Both rates fall because of
firms’ ranking decision, but also because of the labor market being non-segmented in equilib-
rium. To see this, consider a labor market segmented by different subsets of unemployment
11To see this formally, notice that deviating firms must also solve problem (13) because its formulation
allows for workers of a given duration τ not being targeted (i.e. qτ = 0).
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duration. If firms ranked workers by duration given this market structure, callback rates
would exhibit upward jumps as workers of duration τ would be ranked last in one submarket
whereas workers of duration τ + 1 would be ranked first in another submarket. Moreover,
since the probability of being suitable would monotonically decline with duration, the slope
of the duration profile of exit rates would be ambiguous at those points.
It is worth underscoring that sorting is the primary factor underlying the negative re-
lationship between unemployment duration and both callback and exit rates. To be more
precise, the ranking by expected productivity relies on the information flows generated by
the sorting mechanism. If there were no sorting, i.e. if λ` = λh, the probability pτ would
be constant and unemployment duration would not be informative about the applicants’
expected productivity, thereby eliminating the rational grounds of ranking. The equilibrium
allocation would not differ from the standard setting with homogeneous workers, in which
all agents meet in the same market and exit rates and re-employment wages are constant
in unemployment duration. However, arbitrarily small differences in suitability rates across
types would make the component pτ roughly constant over unemployment duration, while
they would translate into large falls in callback and exit rates because of the amplification
through ranking. Likewise, if there were no productivity differences across workers (y` = yh)
and, hence, firms did not rank applicants, exit rates would still decline because of sorting as
pτ would continuously fall with duration.
Proposition 2.4 The callback rate, the job-finding rate and the value of unemployment for
a worker fall with unemployment duration.
We now turn to the determination of equilibrium wages. Wages obtain directly by manip-
ulating the first order conditions of the firms’ problem (13) and the complementary slackness














qτ ′′ (1− e−qτ ′ )∆τ ′
)
+ b+ βUτ+1, (14)
where UT+1 ≡ UT . The left hand side of this expression is the employment value Eτ (ω). In
search models, workers are paid a share of the match surplus on top of their unemployment
value. In directed search models, the worker’s share is determined in equilibrium as the
elasticity of the job-filling probability, which is the fraction in the first term on the right hand
side of equation (14). In our setting with multilateral meetings, it can also be interpreted
as the probability that the applicant is the only one of duration τ conditional on the firm
receiving at least one suitable application of that duration. This term is multiplied by the
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net value of the match minus the expected net value derived from any other potential match
with workers of higher durations.12 In other words, workers are rewarded according to their
marginal value relative to the next best alternative. Now, for workers of low durations the
value of this next best alternative is larger than for workers of high durations, which leads
to a wage profile that is less steep than the productivity profile. This explains the result in
Proposition 2.3 that ex-post profits decline in duration.
Do equilibrium wages decline with unemployment duration? They need not. The
following proposition claims that wages do not always fall with duration if worker types are
sufficiently similar in at least one dimension.
Proposition 2.5 There exists ε > 0 such that wT > wT−1 if either yh−y` < ε or λh−λ` < ε.
To better understand the wage dynamics, consider the T = 2 economy, in which job-
seekers can be either short-term (τ = 1) or long-term (τ = T = 2) unemployed. We rewrite
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It follows that































Consider first the limit case: either y` = yh or λ` = λh. Then, the left hand side of
the inequality is zero because y1 = y2. However, the right hand side is strictly positive
because the first term within the parenthesis is greater than one whereas the second is lower
than one. Thus, w1 < w2. Consider now an arbitrarily small gap in either productivity or
suitability rates between types so that the difference in expected productivity between short-
and long-term workers y1− y2 is also arbitrarily close to zero. Then, the above inequality is
violated, and wages are higher for the long-term unemployed.
12Notice that if there were another applicant of duration τ , the marginal value of the worker would be zero.
Since contractual offers cannot be made contingent on the number of applications received, firms commit
to the expected marginal value of the applicant by averaging over these two events. As Shimer (2005a) and
others have pointed out, equilibrium wages would equal the expected compensation a worker would obtain
if the firm sold the job to the worker by using a second price sealed bid auction.
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The intuition is as follows. If worker types were sufficiently close in either dimension
and were perfectly observable, then their unemployment values should also be close. Since
in our setting types are not observable, but unemployment duration is, then the value of
unemployment could not fall significantly with unemployment duration in that case. As
firms discriminate against long-term unemployed workers in the hiring stage in equilibrium,
w2 would have to be larger than w1 to compensate for the lower matching probability.
Notice that this result of increasing wages holds even if types are very dissimilar in the other
dimension because this large difference is not translated into productivity differences over
unemployment duration. That is, if skilled workers were much less likely to be screened out,
but almost equally productive as the unskilled, expected productivity would decline very
little as the productivity of the unskilled would be a lower bound. Instead, if suitability
rates were arbitrarily close and skilled workers were much more productive, the impact of
sorting would be very weak and the expected productivity decline would also be tiny.
It is apparent from the previous reasoning that expected productivity must fall sufficiently
with unemployment duration to make wages decline. This decline in expected productiv-
ity requires sufficiently large differences in both productivity and suitability rates between
worker types. However, this may not suffice for the T > 2 case as applicants of longer
durations may also queue for the same job and, hence, some degree of convexity in the en-
dogenous distribution of expected productivities seems necessary for falling wages. This is
because firm’s ranking decision implies that workers are worth a share of their marginal value
instead of their productivity, and marginal values may not be monotonically decreasing even
if expected productivities are. Our numerical work for high T values indicates that wages
monotonically decline for a broad range of parameter values, although not in all instances. 13
To conclude, unlike in models with bilateral meetings, where workers get a share of their
productivity net of their own outside option, wages in our model reward the workers’ pro-
ductivity net of workers outside option and the firm’s next best alternative. As a result, the
ranking mechanism in our framework with multilateral meetings compresses wage differences
across workers of different durations.
3 No-ranking Economy
In the benchmark economy, firms have two instruments to discriminate among observation-
ally different candidates. They can offer different wages to different candidates, but also
13While the effect of the next best worker on wages can be significant, the reduction in value due to the
long-term unemployed applicants, which have a low matching probability, tends to be quite small. Blanchard
and Diamond (1994) find a similar result.
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rank them according to expected profitability in the hiring stage. To understand the im-
portance of ranking, we study an alternative setting, to which we refer as the NR economy,
wherein firms can only use wages as a discrimination instrument, and are forced to test all
candidates and randomize among suitable applicants in the hiring stage. Callback rates are,
thus, constant over unemployment duration by construction. Moreover, recruiting firms that
attract applicants of different expected productivities must form rational expectations about
the proportions of each type. Other than that, the economy is identical to the benchmark.
The probability of becoming employed conditional on being suitable for the job ω does
not vary with the worker’ unemployment duration by assumption, and, hence, it amounts
to ν(q(ω)) = 1−e
−q(ω)
q(ω)
, where q(ω) denotes the expected number of applicants to job ω. See
the Online Appendix for further details. The exit rate from unemployment still depends on
the length of the unemployment spell because of the sorting factor, hτ (q(ω)) = pτν(q(ω)).
Consistently, the probability of filling a job equals η(q(ω)) = 1− e−q(ω).
When posting job ω, firms form rational expectations about the probability of filling the
vacancy with a worker of duration τ . Let ρ(ω) ≡
(
ρ1(ω), ..., ρT (ω)
)
be a point of the unit










Likewise, the unemployment value for a worker with unemployment duration τ applying
to job ω is
hτ (q(ω)) (Eτ (ω)− b− βUτ+1) + b+ βUτ+1 ≤ Uτ , and ρτ (ω) ≥ 0, (17)
with complementary slackness, and q(ω) > 0 iff max
τ
ρτ (ω) > 0
Notice that these two expressions are the counterparts of expressions (10) and (8) in the
NR economy, respectively, and only differ in the object ρ. The expectations on the queue
length q and proportions ρ are also pinned down off the equilibrium path to help determine
the equilibrium allocation.
3.1 No-ranking Equilibrium
We next define a symmetric equilibrium in the steady state. We use the term symmetric to
refer to the allocation wherein workers who are observationally identical (i.e. workers with
the same unemployment duration) make identical decisions. However, firms may commit
to different contracts, unlike in the benchmark, and, hence, there may be a number of
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submarkets open in equilibrium.
Definition 2 A steady state no-ranking symmetric directed search equilibrium consists of
a distribution of unemployed workers u ∈ [0, 1]2×T , value functions Jτ , Eτ : [0, yh]T → R+,
and V, Uτ ∈ R+, ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T}, a distribution of vacancies F over the set [0, yh]T with
support Ω, an expected queue length function Q : [0, yh]
T → R+, and an expectation function
ρ : [0, yh]
T →
{
x ∈ [0, 1]T |
∑
t xt = 1
}
such that:
i) Given Q and u, the value functions satisfy the Bellman equations (7), (9), (16) and
(17).
ii) Firms’ profit maximization and zero-profit condition:
Given (Uτ )τ , Q, ρ and u, firms maximize profits at any contract in Ω, and expected
profits are zero:
∀ω∈[0, yh]
T , − k + η(q(ω))
∑
τ
ρτ (ω)Jτ (ω) ≤ V = 0, with equality for ω ∈ Ω
iii) Workers direct their search:
∀ω ∈ [0, yh]T and ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T}, Q(ω) and ρ(ω) satisfy the complementary
slackness condition (17).
∀ω ∈ Ω, Q(ω) > 0, and ∃τ ∈ {1, ..., T} such that ρτ (ω) > 0.
iv) Recursivity condition:
The distribution of workers recursively satisfies







, ∀τ ∈ {2, ..., T − 1},




























ρτ (ω)Q(ω)dF(ω) = λ`u`(τ) + λhuh(τ) (19)
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When designing profit-maximizing contracts, firms form rational expectations about both
the queue length and the proportion of suitable applicants from each duration that apply
to the job. The third equilibrium condition establishes that the expected queue length at
any job ω equals the maximum of the q values that guarantees workers of any duration τ
to obtain the unemployment value Uτ if applying to contract ω. The intuition is as follows.
Consider workers of two different unemployment durations τ and τ ′ applying to contract ω,
and let q and q′, with q < q′, denote the queue lengths that secure their unemployment value.
Then, if q were the equilibrium expected queue length, there would be a flow of workers of
duration τ ′ applying to ω, increasing the ratio of applicants per vacancy, and workers of
duration τ would no longer apply. Moreover, firms form rational expectations about the
proportion of suitable applicants from each duration that apply to the job because the labor
market may be segmented, unlike in the benchmark. The last equilibrium condition ensures
that the sum of suitable applicants of a given duration across markets must be equal to the
total supply of suitable unemployed workers of that duration.
We now turn to the firm’s problem. Given the vector (u, (Uτ )τ ), a firm chooses the
combination of an expected queue length and a wage scheme to maximize its expected
discounted profits. By choosing this pair, the firm is indeed deciding on what type of workers
to target. Since it may not be optimal for the firm to attract all workers as it will not be
able to discriminate among them ex-post, the optimal application condition (17) will only



















Notice that this problem is linear in rτ . Profit-maximization requires that no firm attracts
workers of a duration τ if the expected profits are below the maximum. That is, a firm will
obtain M ≡ max
τ







s. to pτη(qτ )
wτ + βδU1
1− β(1− δ)
≥ qτUτ − qτ (1− pτν(qτ )) (b+ βUτ+1)
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Thus, the firm’s problem reduces to allocating a positive weight to duration τ if the net
returns from attracting only workers of duration τ , Mτ , attain the maximum M and a zero
weight otherwise. If workers of different durations yielded the maximum return, then firms
would be indifferent between attracting applicants from one or several durations. Submarkets
are linked both through the recursivity condition of the state variable u, which helps to
determine both the expected productivity yτ and the suitability probability pτ , and the
unemployment continuation values {Uτ}τ .
The following proposition states existence of an equilibrium allocation with a labor market
fully segmented by unemployment duration, and characterizes the equilibrium. Notice that
any other symmetric equilibrium must be observationally equivalent to this one. It also states
that there is no equilibrium with a single labor market because the τ = T and τ = T − 1
workers will always search in different submarkets as ex-post profits are strictly lower if
forming a match with the former than with the latter.
Proposition 3.1 There exists an equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by
unemployment duration and Ω = {ω1, ..., ωT}, where ωτ consists of a zero wage for all dura-







∆τ + b+ βUτ+1 (22)







Furthermore, there does not exist an equilibrium with a non-segmented market.
The equilibrium equation (23) is the zero-profit condition, whereas expression (22) is the
standard determination of wages and is derived from the first order condition of program (21).
Notice the difference between the benchmark equilibrium wages, determined in expression
(14), and the wages in the NR economy. When ranking is allowed, wages are reduced relative
to the NR wages by the expected value of filling the vacancy with a suitable candidate
of a longer unemployment duration. Therefore, conditional on the same queue lengths,
equilibrium wages in the benchmark would be lower than in the NR economy.
3.2 Equilibrium Duration Dynamics
We turn now to study the dynamics of the equilibrium variables over unemployment dura-
tion. Proposition 2.3 states that expected productivity declines with duration. However,
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we show below that ex-post profits Jτ need not decline with τ in the NR economy. Still,
a worker’s unemployment value falls as the length of the unemployment spell increases if
sorting takes place. Moreover, in contrast to the benchmark, reemployment wages always
fall with duration.
Proposition 3.2 The value of unemployment Uτ and reemployment wages wτ fall with un-
employment duration.
What can be said about the duration dynamics of exit rates from unemployment? If
T = 2, it can be shown that exit rates decrease with duration.14 However, in the general
case, this is more difficult to establish as the two components of the exit rates in the NR
economy, hτ (qτ ) = pτν(qτ ), can move in opposite directions. The first component is related
to the sorting mechanism and always declines with unemployment duration if λ` < λh. The
second factor also falls if qτ increases, which requires that the joint value ∆τ or, equivalently,
ex-post profits decline with duration, according to the zero-profit condition (23). However,
the profits from hiring a worker may increase with the length of her unemployment duration.
For example, consider the limit case of y` = yh. Expected productivity yτ remains constant







of the steady decline in the unemployment value Uτ . In this case, the second component of
the exit rates, ν(qτ ), increases because of a larger firm entry generated by the increase in
∆τ . Therefore, the duration pattern of the exit rates is ambiguous as the two factors move
in opposite directions as duration increases.
3.3 The Qualitative Effects of Ranking by Duration
In our model, sorting leads to an endogenous preference for workers with short unemployment
spells. The multilateral meeting technology together with their ability to discriminate at the
hiring stage permits firms to treat different applicants differently. Against the backdrop of
our discussion of the NR economy we now highlight the role of the firms’ ranking decision.
First, note that the ranking result is independent of whether firms have the ability to
commit to wages contingent on expected productivity or not. If firms can only commit to a
single wage contract as in Lang et al. (2005) and Peters (2010), ranking by productivity is an
obvious outcome. In our setting, like in Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a), as contingent wages
14When T = 2, the labor market is fully segmented as the short-term unemployed workers are more
profitable than their long-term counterparts, i.e. ∆1 > ∆2. As a result, the zero-profit condition implies
that q1 < q2, and, hence, exit rates fall with unemployment duration. Proposition 3.2 states that equilibrium
wages wτ also fall. Notice that this contrasts with the increasing wages over unemployment duration in the
benchmark if worker types are sufficiently close in one dimension as stated in Proposition 2.5
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reward worker’s marginal value, they are compressed enough so that the ex-post profits
fall with expected productivity, and, hence, ranking by expected productivity is an optimal
decision.
The firm’s ability of establishing a hiring order and offering different wages is instrumental
in the labor market being non-segmented in equilibrium. By attracting all workers, firms
increase the chances to fill their vacancies. Moreover, the ranking of applicants allows firms
to further reduce the wage bill for any unemployment duration as they no longer face the
standard trade-off between a lower wage and a lower job-filling probability, since it is now
attenuated by the presence of applicants with longer unemployment spells. As a result, exit
rates fall because of sorting, which lowers the probability of passing the test as unemployment
duration increases, and the ranking decision of firms, which makes callback rates fall with
duration.
When ranking is not permitted instead, the market is segmented in equilibrium. To better
understand this, consider the T = 2 case. When firms have only wages as an instrument
to discriminate among applicants, they find it too costly to attract observationally different
workers at the same time. Suppose that a firm targeting only workers of duration τ = 1
offered the job also to workers with longer unemployment spells to increase the probability of
filling the vacancy. In equilibrium, this positive effect on expected profits would be dominated
by two negative effects. First, the firm would have to compensate the τ = 1 applicants with
higher wages because of the reduction in their job-finding probability. Second, conditional on
filling the vacancy, expected profits would be lower because expected productivity declines
over unemployment duration as stated in Proposition 2.3. In contrast, all firms find it
optimal to attract all types of workers in the benchmark economy because the two negative
effects do not occur when firms can discriminate among candidates in the hiring stage.
Notice that the result of ranking by duration is preserved even for arbitrarily small
differences across worker types. Put differently, ranking has the potential to significantly
amplify the effects of worker differences in either productivity or suitability rates on exit
rates. We discuss the magnitudes of the ranking effect in the following section.
4 Quantitative Exploration
We next calibrate the model to the U.S. economy to gauge how well the benchmark model
captures the data, and to illustrate the quantitative effects of the ranking mechanism. To
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better summarize these effects, we often focus on the values at 3 months of unemployment. 15
Furthermore, we use the calibrated model to explore how the duration dynamics of callback
rates, exit rates and wages are affected by changes in aggregate productivity.
4.1 Calibration and Results
For this numerical illustration, we use publicly available data from Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) and targets from the literature. We present the details of our data work in the
Online Appendix. We now outline our calibration strategy.
We set a period to be a week despite transition rates in and out of unemployment being
estimated at a monthly frequency. The reason for this choice is twofold. First, unemploy-
ment duration is reported in weeks by the subjects surveyed in the CPS, and most of the
action takes place within the first 15 weeks of unemployment. Second, it alleviates the time
aggregation bias of the transition rates as we can construct the model counterparts of actual
monthly aggregates. We comment on this issue further below. The weekly discount factor β
matches a yearly interest rate of 5%. The parameter defining the state of long-term unem-
ployment, T , is set equal to 52 weeks.16 We normalize the market productivity of the skilled
workers to one, yh = 1.
We then jointly calibrate the parameters b, k, δ, λh, λ`, µ, and y`. Following Hall and
Milgrom (2008), we set 71% of average worker productivity as the target for b. Parameter
k is calibrated to match the ratio of vacancy costs to the simulated average quarterly wage
per hire, which is estimated to be 13% by Abowd and Kramarz (2003) -the number Hall and
Milgrom (2008) use is 14%-.
The remaining parameters are related to labor market transitions. We use targets from
the predicted distributions obtained from our data set as described in the Online Appendix. 17
The target for the job-separation rate δ is the average monthly transition rate from employ-
15The reason to choose this specific duration is twofold: it is approximately the average unemployment
duration in our sample, and marks a clear change in the slope of the duration distribution of exit rates.
Moreover, only approximately 17% of the observations in our sample correspond to unemployment durations
longer than 6 months.
16In our dataset 97% of the transitions from unemployment to employment correspond to spells shorter
than one year. Moreover, we find that our results are robust to changes in T . For example, an increase
(decrease) of T by 50% changes the fall of the exit rate at duration 3 months, relative to the first week, from
51.68% in the benchmark calibration to 52.30% (50.49%) after recalibrating.
17Recall expectations are quite common in the U.S. Since we do not model recall, workers expecting to
be rehired by a former employer are not counted as unemployed in the calibration targets we compute from
our predicted data. See e.g. Pries and Rogerson (2005) and Bils et al. (2011) for a similar approach. Fujita
and Moscarini (2012) find that 85% of workers in temporary layoff are rehired. This significantly affects our
estimates of the transition rates.
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Description Value Target
Exogenously Set Parameters
β Discount factor 0.999 Annual interest rate of 5%
T LTU-defining duration 52 -
yh Productivity of skilled 1.0 (Normalization)
Jointly Calibrated Parameters
δ Job-separation rate 0.0033 Predicted monthly job-separation rate
k Vacancy cost 0.7071 13% avg. quarterly wage per hire
b Home productivity 0.6968 71% of avg. productivity
λh Skilled suitability prob. 0.3195 Avg. duration prior to E within next month
λ` Unskilled suitability prob. 0.0832 St. dev., skewness
µ Share of skilled 0.3439 and kurtosis of
y` Productivity of unskilled 0.9712 monthly exit rates
ment (E) to unemployment (U). The predicted EU transition rate has a period average of
0.009.18
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) find that the simple version of the urn-ball matching
technology implies too low an unemployment duration for a given ratio of vacancies to
unemployment. To improve the fit to the data they suggest to add an additional friction
in the form of match-specific suitability. This is indeed the role played by λh in our setting
(whereas λ`
λh
accounts for the relative suitability of the unskilled). Therefore, we set λh to
match an average unemployment duration of 12.57 weeks.19
The remaining parameters, λ`, µ, and y`, are related to the unobserved heterogeneity
across workers. Because differences in types translate into differences in job-finding rates,
our strategy is to make the model replicate the actual duration distribution of monthly exit
rates. Specifically, we target the standard deviation (0.0801), skewness (0.7725), and kurtosis
(2.3267) of the distribution of the predicted monthly exit rates.
Time aggregation bias in the transition rates among employment states has been found
to be quantitatively important, particularly when estimating EU transition rates. The stan-
dard correction for this bias assumes a duration-independent exit rate, see Shimer (2005b).
Obviously, this assumption fails to hold in our setting. Instead of correcting for it in the
data, we simulate data from the model and aggregate appropriately to obtain the model
counterparts of the monthly numbers from the data. For example, for the monthly job-
18This estimate is much lower than the standard one, reported e.g. in Shimer (2005b) for the 1951-2003
period. Yet, it is close to the numbers found by Fujita and Moscarini (2012), also for the period 1994-2012
and conditioning on permanent separations, and close to the estimate in Pries and Rogerson (2005).
19To be precise, average duration is computed as the average length of unemployment spells conditional
on finding a job within the next month both for actual and simulated data.
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separation rates, we compute, out of the total mass of workers who are employed at the
beginning of a given period, how many have become unemployed four periods later. We do
take into account that displaced workers can find new jobs in each of the interim periods,
but we do not consider further rounds in and out of unemployment as their occurrence is
negligible.
Table 1 summarizes our procedure and estimates. All the targets are very accurately
matched. One out of three workers in our economy is skilled, and they account for about
11% of the unemployed. The skilled are about four times more likely to be suitable, and
almost 3% more productive when employed.20 We can compare our model outcomes to
other available data moments not targeted in the calibration. First, the model steady state
unemployment rate is 3.79, slightly below its data counterpart of 4.18. Second, the number
of the tested unemployed per vacancy is 5.17 in the model, close to the 6.33 documented by
Barron et al. (1985) for the U.S. 1980 EOPP survey, but far away from the 12 reported by
van Ours and Ridder (1992) using Dutch 1987 data.
We now turn to the duration profiles of exit rates, callback rates, and wages. Figure
1(a) depicts normalized simulated data of the monthly exit rates from our calibrated model
together with the actual values. The model matches the actual duration function of the exit
rates from unemployment remarkably well. The monthly job-finding rate after 13 weeks of
unemployment, roughly the average unemployment duration, is 51.68% of the rate at the
first week (vs. 50% in the data). As in the actual data, the simulated duration function
shows a severe decline over the first 3 months and flattens out from then on. Furthermore, we
also closely match the level of the non-normalized exit rates not targeted in the calibration.
The simulated monthly job-finding probability at the first week of unemployment is 0.43,
whereas it is 0.44 in the data.
Moreover, our calibrated model delivers a distribution of callback rates. As shown in
Figure 2, these rates strongly fall across duration. Specifically, callback rates fall by 24% from
one month of unemployment to six months. The field experiments conducted in Oberholzer-
Gee (2008) for Switzerland, Kroft et al. (2013) for the U.S. and Eriksson and Rooth (2014)
20Our interpretation of the small difference in productivities together with the large difference in suitability
rates is as follows. The suitability friction has a direct effect on the duration distribution of exit rates. In
contrast, productivity differences only affect them indirectly through its effects on vacancy creation, and such
effects are attenuated because of the ranking decision of firms. That is, regardless of how low the expected
productivity is, the exit rate of a suitable candidate with a 10-week unemployment spell is primarily reduced
by the presence of other applicants with shorter durations who are ranked higher. In contrast, in the NR
economy, productivity has a much stronger effect on vacancy creation for all durations and thus productivity
differences need to be larger to match a given duration profile of exit rates. Specifically, when the NR
economy is calibrated to the same set of targets (as reported in Appendix 6.4), productivity differences are
much larger, while the suitability rates are marginally different from the ones in the baseline calibration.
26
Duration (weeks)







(a) Monthly Exit Rates
Duration (weeks)









Figure 1: Distributions over Unemployment Duration: Model and Data.
Note: Exit rates from unemployment are the transition rates from unemployment to employment within the
following month. Wages are the expected wage conditional on being employed after four weeks. All values
are normalized by the value at the first week.
for Sweden also show a steep decline of callback rates along duration. In particular, in Kroft
et al. (2013) fictitious job-seekers of different unemployment duration each submit a single
application and wait for an interview call for up to 6 weeks, although most calls arrive within
the first two weeks. They find that their estimated callback rates fall by 20% from one month
of unemployment to six months.
Next, we consider reemployment wages. Recall that we do not use any target related
to wages in our calibration. Figure 1(b) displays the normalized simulated wages together
with the normalized predicted wages estimated from CPS data. To be consistent with the
data counterpart, simulated wages for any duration τ are computed as the expected wage
conditional on being employed after 4 weeks. While we show the wages on a magnified scale
for better visibility, the model distribution of wages over unemployment duration is very
close to the actual one. Indeed, model wages are compressed slightly more than what we
observe in the data. They fall by 0.8% after three months of unemployment (vs. 2.3% in
the data) and very slightly increase towards the end. Another way to compare the two wage
series is to compute the duration elasticity of the simulated wages by applying the regression
procedure that we used for the actual data. We obtain that the data and simulated duration
elasticities are -0.0090 and -0.0032, respectively.
Why is our model able to generate the diverging pattern of exit rates and wages present
in the data? Notice that workers are heterogenous along two dimensions, which both affect
wages and exit rates. The productivity difference, yh − y`, is fairly small in our calibration
27
and thus expected productivity and wages do not fall much along duration. In contrast, the
large difference in the suitability parameters λh and λ` allows for a large variation of the
probability of being suitable, pτ , across durations. This makes the fall in exit rates strong.
As we argue below, the ranking component also substantially contributes to explaining the
different slopes of exit rates and wages along duration.
Decomposing the Exit Rate Dynamics. We now decompose the exit rates from our
calibrated economy into its three components determined in expression (6), i.e. the callback
rate (e−
∑
τ ′<τ qτ ′ ), the probability of passing the suitability test (pτ ), and the pure coordi-
nation friction for duration-τ workers ((1 − e−qτ )/qτ ). Figure 2 plots the job-finding rate
as well as its components, all normalized by the respective first value. As the components
cannot be individually time-aggregated we report weekly values. Both the callback rates,
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Figure 2: Components of Weekly Exit Rates
Notes: All values are determined on a weekly basis and normalized by the value at the first week.
which capture the ranking decision, and the probability of being suitable first rapidly decline
and then flatten out. The latter declines fast initially because of the large differences in suit-
ability rates leading to a strong sorting effect that becomes less pronounced as the pool of
unemployed more and more consists only of unskilled applicants. Further, due to sorting and
hiring, the pool of unemployed, and thus the ratio qτ , becomes smaller with duration. This
implies that a worker of low duration has relatively many competitors from the next lower
duration, whereas this is not as pronounced for workers with long spells. Thus, the callback
rate initially declines fast and then becomes flatter with duration. Finally, as qτ decreases
the coordination friction becomes less severe and therefore slightly increases with duration.
Unlike the first two components, the pure coordination friction does not contribute much to
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the duration dynamics in quantitative terms.21
4.2 The Quantitative Effects of Ranking by Duration
To provide further insights on the quantitative effects of ranking, Figure 3(a) plots the exit
rate of the benchmark model with (h) and without (ĥ) the callback rate component as well as
the exit rates of the NR economy (hNR) using the same calibrated parameters. Going from
the overall exit rate h to the counterfactual rate ĥ, we see that without the ranking effect
the duration profile becomes much flatter. This difference is due to the amplifying effect of
ranking on the fall of the exit rate. Next, the move from ĥ to hNR captures the additional
general equilibrium effects of ruling out ranking. While the slope of the duration profile
stays similar to the one of ĥ, there is a downward shift of the whole distribution in addition.
As a result, without ranking workers of low duration have a lower exit rate, whereas it is
the opposite for workers with high duration. In the benchmark economy, workers with short
unemployment spells face more job opportunities than in the NR economy because of a larger
entry of firms due to higher expected profits and being ranked ahead. In contrast, applicants
with longer unemployment spells are discriminated against in the benchmark, which is not
the case in the NR economy. Our calibration suggests that the difference between the two
environments regarding the decline of the exit rates is quantitatively significant. The fall
in the monthly exit rate after 3 months relative to the first week is 48% in the benchmark
-which is closely matching the fall in the data-, and only 37% in the NR economy. 22
We can also show the effects of ranking on wages. Similar to the above comparison we
first compute counterfactual wages by omitting the summation term from expression (14).
As explained above, this summation term is due to the ability of the firm to rank applicants
and represents the expected value of the next best alternative. To capture the general
equilibrium effect we compare to the wages of the NR economy, again using the parameters
of the calibrated benchmark model. Figure 3(b) shows the wages for the benchmark (w), the
counterfactual wages without the ranking component (ŵ), and the NR wages (wNR), which
fall by 1.3% after three months of unemployment.
Wages of low durations are increased more than wages for high duration when we remove
21In terms of levels, only the sorting factor is significantly below one at the first week and thus is the
dominating component for determining the level of the job-finding rate at the first week. Recall that the
callback rate at the first week is one by construction.
22While the distributions of the exit rates strongly differ across economies, the average monthly job-finding
rates and implied unemployment rates are quite similar. They are 26.4% and 3.8% for the benchmark
economy and 26.6% and 3.6% for the NR economy, respectively. Further, the vacancy rates are 0.72% for
the benchmark and 0.75% for the NR economy, respectively.
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Figure 3: The Effects of Ranking
Note: Exit rates and wages are determined on a weekly basis and reported as non-normalized values. Symbols
h and w refer to the equilibrium exit rates and wages in the benchmark economy, whereas ĥ and ŵ denote
the same rates and wages without the ranking factor. Symbols hNR and wNR denote the equilibrium exit
rates and wages in the NR economy.
the ranking component of wages, i.e. when moving from w to ŵ. This is due to the fact that
the expected value of the next best alternative is higher for applicants of low duration. If in
addition general equilibrium effects are taken into account, wages wNR still show a steeper
decline, and are shifted downwards so that only workers with short spells get a higher wage in
the case of no ranking. Wages across duration are therefore more compressed in the presence
of ranking.
If we instead recalibrate the NR economy using the same targets, exit rates will match
closely the targeted empirical exit rates, but now wages will decline much more strongly
than in the data because the difference in the productivity values across types is now much
larger. See the Online Appendix for details. Thus, the ranking element helps to capture the
duration profiles of both exit rates and wages in the data.
As an anonymous referee points out, the sizable effect of ranking may depend on the
stylized way we model the testing technology. In particular, if firms also received some sig-
nal on productivity when screening applicants, the information conveyed by unemployment
duration might play a smaller role and the quantitative effects of ranking might be smaller.
In the Online Appendix we investigate the quantitative effects of such a more general testing
technology and find only minor differences.
The previous analysis has decomposed the duration dynamics of exit rates and wages into
its main driving factors, namely ranking and sorting. Recall that ranking is an endogenous
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response to sorting in our model and therefore cannot be considered as an independent
factor. In particular, the relationship between ranking and sorting is very non-linear. When
there are no differences in suitability rates, unemployment duration is not informative, and
hence firms have no reason to rank candidates. However, even if there is an arbitrarily small
difference in suitability rates, firms will rank, thereby largely affecting callback rates. To
give an example, in our calibrated benchmark, the weekly rate of being suitable declines by
45% after 3 months, whereas callback rates fall by 31%. Now, if we decrease λh to a value of
just 5% above λ`, the fall in the suitability factor reduces to less than a tenth of a percent,
whereas callback rates still decline by 27%. Likewise, the wage fall is reduced from 1% to
approximately 0%. Thus, even a small amount of unobserved heterogeneity can lead to a
large effect on callback rates.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This article analyzes the effects of firm’s recruiting decisions in a labor market in which
information on worker type is symmetric and incomplete and firms test applicants. Our
composite mechanism combines sorting and ranking, and there exists a single labor market
in equilibrium. The model rationalizes the joint declining pattern of callback rates for an
interview, exit rates from unemployment and reemployment wages.
A natural question is how sensitive the main results are to the information structure of the
model conditional on information being symmetrically held. Although these assumptions are
made for tractability, we conjecture that if either complete worker histories were observable
or the continuation value depended on the worker’s search, ranking by expected productivity
would still take place in equilibrium because of the two incentives firms have to attract many
applicants, namely to increase the job-filling probability and to reduce wages because the
marginal value of a worker is reduced by the presence of other applicants. However, if the
whole labor history were observable, expected productivity would be inferred from the whole
history of the worker instead of from the current spell and the single-market equilibrium
feature would be preserved. We conjecture that, if workers did learn from their job-search
experience, e.g. from receiving test calls or from the expected queue length associated to
their individual application, multiple labor submarkets would be active in equilibrium and
ranking by unemployment duration would prevail in each submarket.
Furthermore, by reducing the whole learning process to a test, probationary periods are
ruled out in our model. Our intuition is that firms would continue to rank applicants by
expected productivity if probation and more complex wage schemes were allowed. This is
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because in any case firms would prefer to fill the vacancy with candidates of higher expected
productivity. If instead wages could not be re-adjusted when new information is acquired,
then modeling worker’s type as an experience good would make dismissals informative, which
would get us back to the previous discussion about the importance of the whole labor history
of workers. In contrast, in our setting worker’s productivity is an inspection good, thereby
limiting the information to the unemployment spell.
Our paper has focused on the positive analysis of equilibrium. It turns out that unlike
in the static settings of Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a) the decentralized allocation is not
constrained efficient due to an intertemporal information externality. We investigate and
discuss this issue in the Online Appendix.
Finally, although this paper has focused on the steady-state equilibrium, notice that the
information conveyed by the length of joblessness spells varies over the cycle. In tight labor
markets, with a large number of vacancies per job-seeker, unemployment duration is more
informative about the expected skills of the applicants than in slack markets. Although our
comparative static analysis in the Online Appendix suggests that the ranking by duration
dominates the sorting effects, a more comprehensive business cycle study is needed, which
we leave for future research.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1
We first show that there exists a solution to the firm’s problem (13). After some manip-
ulations and substituting out the wages from the complementary slackness conditions (8),







τ )∆τ − qτ





1−β(1−δ) − b − βUτ+1. If a sufficiently low wage wτ for some τ is offered, then
qτ = 0 and the firm derives no profits from type τ applicants.
Notice that the profit function is continuous in qT . The set of plausible vectors qT can be
restricted to a compact set since they must be non-negative and the complementary slackness
conditions (8) puts an upper bound for any duration τ . Therefore, the Weierstrass Theorem
ensures the existence of a solution.
Second, we prove by contradiction that if there exists a symmetric equilibrium, then
qτ > 0 for all τ . Suppose that there exists at least one duration group of workers such that
its associated queue is 0. Let us denote by τ0 the first duration for which the queue length
is 0. To be consistent with the guess that profitability falls with unemployment duration,
which is confirmed in Proposition 2.3, all queues associated with longer durations must also
be 0. Then, the unemployment value of workers with unemployment duration greater than
or equal to τ0 must be b/(1−β) as they will remain unemployed forever. Let ω be the profit-
maximizing contract. Given that y` > b, there exists an arbitrarily small, but positive ε such
that b + ε < yτ0 . Consider now the alternative contract ω
′ that stipulates the same wages
as ω, but offers type τ0 workers a wage b + ε. Because of the ranking strategies, workers of
duration τ0 do not crowd out the candidates with higher expected productivities, and imply
expected positive profits for the firm. Because the alternative contract ω′ delivers strictly
higher profits than ω, this cannot be profit-maximizing. Therefore, qτ > 0 for all τ .
Finally, we show that if ∆τ falls with τ , then the solution of the firm’s problem is unique,
and is characterized by the first order conditions.
35
















As ∆τ declines with τ , all the coefficients of the Hessian matrix are negative, hij < 0. To
show that the Hessian is negative definite, we prove that the leading principal minors of the
Hessian alternate signs. Notice that hij does not depend on i. Thus, the Hessian has a very
particular form as hij = hi′j for all i, i
′ ≤ j and, obviously, hij = hij′ for all j, j ′ ≤ i. Let
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The sign of the expression is positive if j is even and negative otherwise. Therefore, the
Hessian is negative definite and the FOC are also sufficient. Furthermore, since this is the
case at any point, the objective function is strictly concave and there is a unique global
maximum. ‖
Proof of Proposition 2.5.
Consider first the case of small differences in the suitability rate, λh = λ` + ε, with ε > 0
arbitrarily small. After some simple simplifications, we can write the difference in expected
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productivities as








yhλhuh(T − 1) + y`λ`u`(T − 1)
)
×
λhuh(T − 1) + λ`u`(T − 1)







Notice that the right hand side vanishes as ε goes to 0. Therefore, the left hand side of the
last inequality of the counterpart of expression (15) for durations T − 1 and T is arbitrarily
close to 0, whereas the right hand side is strictly positive, which implies wT−1 < wT .
The case with arbitrarily small differences in productivity is obvious because the expected
productivity yτ is a convex combination of y` and yh, and, hence, yT−1 − yT < yh − y`.‖
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Consider the case in which all recruiting firms target a single duration by posting contract
ωτ , which has all its components equal to 0 except the wage wτ . Let a submarket be
defined by the pair (qτ , ωτ ) that is the maximizer of the firm problem (21). Given u and
(Uτ )τ , such a solution is pinned down by equations (22) and (23), which correspond to the
first order condition and the zero-profit condition, respectively. We define Q(ωτ ) = qτ and
ρτ (ω
′
τ ) = Iτ (τ
′), where Iτ (τ ′) is an indicator function that values 1 if τ = τ ′ and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, for any other ω ∈ [0, yh]T , Q(ω) is pinned down by the maximum queue length
that makes workers of all durations indifferent to the equilibrium contract to which they
apply to. It is easy to show that it satisfies all the remaining equilibrium conditions.
Now, before showing the existence of the fully segmented equilibrium, we prove that there
cannot be an equilibrium with a single labor market. If there were a pooling equilibrium,
then all workers would face the same expected queue length. Proposition 2.3 states that
expected productivity falls with unemployment duration. Therefore, ∆T−1 > ∆T , and the
zero-profit condition (23) implies that qT−1 < qT . That is, workers with unemployment
duration T − 1 and T must search in different submarkets in equilibrium.
We next show the existence of a fully segmented equilibrium, which resembles the proof




T is a compact set. We
define f as the composite correspondence f ≡ φ ◦ ψ, where φ and ψ are defined as follows.
First, let z ≡ (u, (U ′τ )τ ) and ψ(z) be defined as the set of elements {qτ , wτ , Uτ}τ that satisfy
the zero-profit conditions (23), solve the firms’ profit maximization program (21) and Uτ
is obtained as a new iteration using equation (17). Second, let φ be a function defined as
φ(ω, qT , (Uτ )τ ) ≡ (ũ, (Ũτ )τ ), where ũ is uniquely determined by the equilibrium recursivity
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condition (18), and Ũτ = Uτ for all τ . Notice that the equilibrium allocation can be identified
with the solution of a fixed point of correspondence f . We are to show that f is a continuous
function, and, then, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem applies to ensure the existence of a
fixed point of f .
To show that f is a continuous function, it suffices to show that ψ(z) is singleton and
continuous for every z ∈ K as its other component is obviously a continuous function. Notice
that the objective function of program (21), after replacing wages, is strictly concave in q.
Therefore ψ is a function. The Maximum Theorem ensures that ψ is continuous in z ∈ K.
Therefore, the composite function is also a continuous function.‖
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
We first show that the unemployment value falls with duration. The proof is by backwards
induction. Recall that the value of unemployment can be written as
Uτ = hτ (qτ )γ(qτ )∆τ + b+ βUt+1 = pτe
−qτ∆τ + b+ βUt+1
First, we show that UT < UT−1.
UT < UT−1 ⇔ pT e
−qT∆T < pT−1e
−qT−1γ(qT−1)∆T−1
Notice that ∆T ≤ ∆T−1 and pT < pT−1 if λ` < λh. Then, the zero-profit condition (23)
implies qT−1 ≤ qT . Therefore, UT < UT−1.
Second, we assume that Ut+1 < Ut for τ ≤ t ≤ T − 1, and show that Uτ < Uτ−1. Let
m ≡ min{pτ−1e−qτ−1 , pτe−qτ} and m ≡ max{pτ−1e−qτ−1 , pτe−qτ}
































where the last inequality stems from the induction assumption and productivity difference
if any.
Now, we turn to prove that wages always fall with unemployment duration. Consider
first the case in which the joint value ∆τ also falls. Then, the expected queue length qτ
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must increase for the zero-profit condition (23) to hold in equilibrium. As all the terms in
the equilibrium wage equation (22) fall, so do wages. Consider now the case in which ∆τ
increases with unemployment duration. Then, equation (23) implies that qτ declines with τ .
Now, we can rewrite the zero-profit condition as k = η(qτ )
yτ−wτ
1−β(1−δ) . Since the second factor
on the right hand side must increase with τ because the first factor decreases. Proposition
2.3 establishes that yτ decreases and, hence, so must wτ for the ex-post profits to increase.‖
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